Brandon Berg's blog

Summers Vindicated; Feminists Spinning

From Jeff Fecke, the new guy at Alas, a bit of feminist triumphalism regarding a study finding no significant difference in math performance between boys and girls:

So, people, do you remember Larry Summers? Poor, poor Larry Summers, who was attacked mercilessly by those humorless feminists, just because he said women weren’t as good as men at math? He’s been held up by the gender essentialist set as a martyr to the cause of political correctness, convicted in what professional concern-troll William Saletan called a “pseudo-feminist show trial” for daring to give voice to the truth: that women are simply inferior to men when it comes to math. Though they do, I’m told, excel at baking.

This was all very horrible for poor Larry, except for the fact that he was absolutely, categorically wrong. As most of the feminist meanies already knew, women aren’t inferior to men in ability to learn math, science, or anything else. And now we have the data to prove it.

This is very wrong. First off, Fecke's characterization of Summers' argument is almost libelous in its inaccuracy. Summers gave three hypotheses for the underrepresentation of women in math and science, in what he believed was descending order of importance:

1. Women are, on average, less willing or able (e.g., because of the demands of motherhood) to make the commitment of time and energy needed to succeed in highly competitive careers.

2. Although men and women are roughly equally intelligent on average, the male intelligence distribution has higher variance, so men are overrepresented at both tails of the distribution, which is where academics come from*.

3. Differential socialization.

Nowhere did Summers say anything about women being inferior to men, either in general or in terms of math ability. A study finding that boys and girls perform on average equally well on a test of basic math skills is perfectly consistent with everything Summers said.

A couple of commenters pointed out this error, but were quick to assert their feminist bona fides by saying that Summers was wrong about the variation too--that men aren't really overrepresented at the tails of the intelligence distribution. This is wrong. They are, and the study in question backs this up, even though the press release explicitly says otherwise:

Some critics argue, however, that even when average performance is equal, gender discrepancies may still exist at the highest levels of mathematical ability. So the team searched for those, as well. For example, they compared the variability in boys' and girls' math scores, the idea being that if more boys fell into the top scoring percentiles than girls, the variance in their scores would be greater. Again, the effort uncovered little difference, as did a comparison of how well boys and girls did on questions requiring complex problem solving.

I guess it depends on how you define "little." According to this supplement (PDF), the study did find that at the 99th percentile, white boys outnumbered white girls 2 to 1:

For whites, there are 1.45 times as many boys as girls above the 95%ile in grade 11, and twice as many boys as girls above the 99%ile.

Interestingly, this pattern did not hold among Asian Americans:

For Asian Americans, however, at the 99%ile, the gender ratio is 0.91, meaning that more girls than boys scored above the 99%ile.

Also, if you look at table S2 in the supplement, you'll see a fairly large negative effect size for maleness specific to blacks and American Indians--that is, they scored on average 8-9% lower than their female counterparts.

See also the table on page 9 of this document (PDF) from the College Board. In 2004, boys were 2.2 times as likely as girls to score 750+ on the math section (97.8th percentile). The study mentioned above comments on the fact that the average SAT score is higher for boys than for girls and chalks it up to sampling bias (more girls than boys take the SAT), but there's no mention of the sex imbalance in the 700+ range.

To point out what should be obvious, the fact that males outnumber females at the tails of the math ability distribution doesn't mean that we have to tell girls who are good at math that they can't become physicists or mathematicians or software engineers**. It just means that we can't take underrepresentation of women in these fields as a priori evidence of systematic discrimination.

See also Bob Hayes, who should quit slacking off and get back to blogging.

*No comment on which disciplines draw from which tails.

**I'm all for more women in my workplace, albeit for distinctly non-feminist reasons.


The Problem with Pragmatism

Recycling a comment I made on this post by Bobvis:

The problem with pragmatism is that it's just not practical. Ideal pragmatism is great--freed from ideological constraints, you can just do what works!--but ideal pragmatism isn't an option.

What we actually get is real-world pragmatism: People's beliefs about what policies produce the best results are driven more by ideology and cognitive bias than by actual evidence. And those are just the people who at least make a good-faith (if weak) attempt at intellectual honesty. Those with vested interests in certain policies may deliberately present evidence skewed in favor of their side. In short, we get something not entirely dissimilar to the system we have now.

The weakness of a principled approach--that it leaves no room for discretion--is also its strength, since discretion is as likely to be used for ill as for good. More likely, I'd say. An electorate with a knee-jerk anti-government reflex is likely to produce better policy than one laboring under the illusion that it's enlightened and pragmatic.

The best approach, I think, is to give liberty the benefit of the doubt in all cases, much as we do for criminal defendants. Only intervene where there's a strong consensus that it's absolutely necessary. For example, if I were writing a constitution, I would require a 4/5 majority in the legislature to pass a new law, and require only a simple majority, or perhaps a 2/5 minority, to void an existing law.


How to Constrain Entitlement Spending

For those who don't see how we can possibly avert the Social Security/Medicare train wreck without raising taxes, here's a quick primer on how budgeting works for everyone who isn't the government:

1. Figure out how much money you can spend.
2. Take the figure from line 1 and allocate it according to your priorities.

And you know what? It works for government programs, too! Take Medicare*. It's funded by a 2.9% payroll tax. So Medicare's budget for any given year will be whatever amount of money is raised by that tax. Now all that's left to do is allocate it according to your priorities. To keep spending under the limit, you can raise the age of eligibility, cut back coverage of treatments with high cost/benefit ratios, increase copays, limit coverage to generic drugs, outsource expensive procedures, or any combination of the above**. Anything goes, as long as you stay within the budget.

Same deal with Social Security. It's funded by a 12.4% tax on wages up to $100k or so--index the cap to the 90th wage percentile (or whatever), and you can keep it going until the end of time. Just don't jack up the monthly checks too high, or if you do, increase the retirement age to compensate. It's as easy as that.

* Please!

** Note that this is not likely to reduce quality of care available. The main problems with Medicare are that life expectancy is increasing, meaning that a greater percentage of the population is eligible, and new, expensive treatments are becoming available. The changes necessary to keep spending within budget should only slow the rate at which coverage improves.


Leftism Isn't Progressive

American leftists have a habit of adopting (or stealing) labels that don't accurately describe them. For example, the agenda of the left--which consists primarily of putting more and more of the economy under the control of the government--is downright illiberal, yet they insisted on appropriating the term "liberal" from the libertarians whom it accurately described.

In recent years, the term "liberal" has acquired some negative connotations--80 years of association with the left will do that--so they've decreed that they shall once again be called "progressives." I object to this for two reasons:

1. It's a lame rhetorical tactic. Just about everyone thinks that his agenda will promote progress. Really, we libertarians don't sit around thinking up ways to drive the economy back into a state of preindustrial squalor*. You don't get to use a declaration of victory as the name of your political philosophy. Well, obviously you can, but I call BS.

2. It's just not true. Marginal tax rates in excess of 50% aren't conducive to progress. Protectionism isn't conducive to progress. Not even if you call it "fair trade." Price controls that reduce the returns to medical innovation aren't conducive to progress. Throwing more and more money at schools that have failed year after year to educate students adequately is not conducive to progress. Policies that discourage the accumulation of capital (e.g., income vs. consumption tax) are not conducive to progress. (Market) Liberalism is progressive. Leftism is not.

Yes, I'm unilaterally declaring victory, too, but I'm not asking for an implicit pat on the back every time someone refers to my political philosophy.

Libertarians and conservatives shouldn't indulge the left in this. At the very least, we should refrain from using the term ourselves to describe leftists. Even better, call the foul every now and then.

*There are some religious fundamentalists and/or PCMNWs who actually do, but they still consider it progress.


Drug Dealing as Murder

From the Minnesota statutes:

609.195 MURDER IN THE THIRD DEGREE.
(a) Whoever, without intent to effect the death of any person, causes the death of another by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life, is guilty of murder in the third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 25 years.

(b) Whoever, without intent to cause death, proximately causes the death of a human being by, directly or indirectly, unlawfully selling, giving away, bartering, delivering, exchanging, distributing, or administering a controlled substance classified in schedule I or II, is guilty of murder in the third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 25 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $40,000, or both.

Am I misreading that, or does it really mean that if you die of a drug overdose your dealer can be prosecuted for murder?


Property Is Worth Killing Over

There's been a lot of wailing and gnashing of teeth over the decision by a Texas grand jury not to indict Joe Horn for shooting two men who burglarized the home of his vacationing neighbor.

One common sentiment I've seen, even from some people who support the decision not to indict Horn, is that property isn't worth killing over, because life is sacred and property isn't, or some variation on that platitude.

This is nonsense--property is worth killing over because property is life. I spend 40% of my waking hours doing something I'd rather not be doing in order to make money. Mind you, I have a pretty good job, but when I get up in the morning, I can think of a hundred ways I'd rather spend the day than going in to work, if it weren't for the money. For people who really hate their jobs, this feeling is no doubt much stronger.

When your property is lost or stolen, it means that the portion of your life that you sacrificed to earn that money has been wasted. A thief who steals your property also steals a small part of your life. And a small part of the life of his next victim, and his next, until it adds up to the equivalent of murder. Property crime is piecemeal murder, and I wholeheartedly endorse the use of force--deadly if necessary--to stop piecemeal murder.


Wherein a Catallarchist Goes Green

Did you know that the brain is responsible for 20% of the body's energy consumption? In an effort to do my part for the environment, I'll be recycling a comment (of which I was reminded by the penultimate paragraph of Constant's recent post) in lieu of expending the brainpower needed to think up a new post:

I agree that it's perfectly legitimate to be upset about statistical discrimination. But insofar as statistical discrimination is a rational response to the incentives faced, I don't think it makes sense to be upset at the discriminator. You can't blame people for looking out for their own interests. Rather, the blame lies with those who make discrimination pay off.

Most people understand this, at least implicitly. For example, I resent the fact that I have to pay higher insurance rates than I would as a woman with a comparable driving record. But I don't blame my insurance company--I blame young men who drive recklessly.

Many Americans are unhappy with the way Europeans view us. There's some disagreement regarding whether this is statistical discrimination or bigotry. But those who believe that it's statistical discrimination are nearly unanimous in placing the blame on the "ugly Americans" who make the rest of us look bad rather than on the Europeans.

Likewise, no one blames a woman for crossing to the other side of the street when encountering a man after dark--we blame the men who justify this response.

It's only when the discrimination is against members of certain victim classes that we blame the discriminator.


Correlations Are Real-Valued

Dave (non-Masten) on the importance of IQ:

Sure if they have brain damage that inhibits them from handling higher math they may have behavior problems also. If they have an IQ of 95 and do well as a clerk in a shoe store, is this a poorer outcome than being a slick high IQ type like Ted Bundy or Al Capone. Admittedly a shoe clerk might not have high social status but if you exclude persons from success this way there seems to be a certain elitism that is not scientific.

First off, no one's saying that there's anything wrong with being a shoe salesman. I think that someone with an IQ of 95 would probably be capable of--and better off by--learning a skilled trade, but there's a place for everyone, and if retail sales clerk is the best someone can do, then it's as honorable an occupation as any.

Second, low IQ isn't brain damage. It can be caused by brain damage, but undamaged brains have a wide range of ability levels, and AFAIK there's no evidence that the correlation between low IQ and antisocial behavior is due entirely to brain damage.

But the main point I wanted to address was this:

If they have an IQ of 95 and do well as a clerk in a shoe store, is this a poorer outcome than being a slick high IQ type like Ted Bundy or Al Capone.

This is a fallacy I see far too often: The idea that the only possible values of a correlation are -1, 0, or 1. Or, in layman's terms, the idea that a single counterexample invalidates a rule of thumb. It doesn't work that way. When we say that low IQ is correlated with undesirable life outcomes, we mean that people with low IQs are much more likely than people with high IQs to live in poverty, commit crimes, drop out of high school, receive welfare, and have children out of wedlock. That doesn't mean that people with high IQs never do these things, or that people with low IQs always do; it just means that people with high IQs are much less likely to.

The existence of high-IQ criminals like Bundy and Capone only proves that there's not a perfect correlation between IQ and criminality. But no one ever claimed there was.


The Problem with Progressivity

There's an argument in the comments section of this post at Alas about the effects of marginal tax rates on labor supply.

I do think that there's something to the idea that the short-term labor supply is somewhat inelastic. Ronald Reagan's stories of making a few movies and then taking the rest of the year off were plausible in the days of 90% marginal tax rates, but it's much harder to imagine a surgeon or CEO quitting or cutting back on hours if his marginal tax rate goes from 40% to 50%.

But the long-term effects of a steeply progressive income tax may be a different story altogether, because then we have to take into account the effect of the tax structure on future career choices.

For example, to become a doctor takes a lot of work. Four years of college, four of medical school, and then another three to ten of on-the-job training, depending on the specialty. After that, they start making a lot of money. They have to, to make up for the fact that they've missed out on 7-14 years of post-college earning potential, and for the 100-hour workweeks residents have to put up with.

I did the math, and it turns out that my decision to drop out of college at 19 to work as a software engineer actually compares favorably to most types of medicine (except for the most lucrative specialties) in terms of lifetime income potential, even assuming that I never hit it big with stock options or by starting my own company.

Insofar as that's just a result of market forces--if it's because consumers want 45 years of software engineering starting now more than they want 35 years of medicine starting ten years from now--that's fine. But the incentives are distorted by the progressive tax system. Even if a doctor and I made exactly the same amont of money over our lifetimes (ignoring for the sake of simplicity issues of time preference), he'd end up with a higher effective tax rate than I would, because my income is spread out over more years, putting me in a lower bracket. The more progressive the income tax, the less incentive there is to go into medicine.

This also applies to any career that involves working long hours in exchange for more money. Suppose that by working 80 hours per week instead of 40, you can double your salary. But with a progressive tax rate, you take home significantly less than twice as much money, which pushes people away from careers that require long hours. I was considering going to law school at one point, and this was an actual factor in my decision not to.

Another example: Entrepreneurship. Paul Graham has spoken of starting a new company as a way of compressing your work life: Start a company, work like crazy for a period of several years, sell it, and you're set for life. Steeply progressive income taxation makes this less attractive, because your income spikes through the roof the year you sell the company, putting you in the highest tax bracket. And people don't respond by doing it twice to make up the difference--once is bad enough. Instead they just keep working for established companies for the safe paycheck with the relatively low tax rate.

Incentives matter. Even if you think you can outsmart the laws of economics in the short run, they'll come back to bite you in the long run.


Psychic Hedging Insurance

I was thinking recently that I'd be pretty bummed out if I were blinded or paralyzed or suffered some other kind of life-changing injury. It then occurred to me that, while I probably could never truly be made whole, I might be a bit less bummed out if a very large sum of money were deposited into my bank account shortly after my injury.

I already have disability insurance, but this only pays 60% of my salary at the time of injury, which pays the bills but doesn't make me feel any better. And as a software engineer, I can take a lot of physical damage without really being disabled.

What I really want is psychic hedging insurance. I want to pay an insurer a monthly premium in exchange for a promise to pay me, say, $2 million in the event that I become legally blind, $3 million in the event of lower-body paralysis, $5 million for total-body paralysis, etc.

Does anyone know if such a product exists? Is it even feasible, or are there too many people who would happily poke their own eyes out for $2 million?


In Which Matthew Yglesias Loses All Sense of Proportion

Matthew Yglesias on the reasons the US doesn't have shiny new infrastructure like Singapore's:

In part, a country like the United States just isn't going to be able to compete infrastructure-wise with a newly-prosperous country like Singapore -- we have a lot of stuff that's oldish, but still usable, and shutting it down to fix or replace it would be extremely inconvenient. But it's also the case that Singapore's not spending 1 percent of GDP a year on a misguided effort to control Iraq.

Right. It's not the sprawling welfare state on which we spend something like 10% of GDP more than Singapore. It's that extra 1% of GDP we spend on the military.


Blacks, Hispanics, and Health Outcomes

In the US, blacks score significantly worse than non-Hispanic whites* on many health metrics, such as life expectancy and infant mortality. In 1999, a black man could expect to live 6.4 years less than a white man, while a black woman could expect to live 5 years less than a white woman. And the infant mortality rate for black mothers is more than twice that for non-Hispanic white mothers.

One of the most popular hypotheses to explain this fact is that blacks don't have as much access to quality health care as whites. This is superficially plausible--see for example the chart on page 18 of this PDF, which shows that 10.6% of non-Hispanic whites lack medical insurance compared to 19.4% of blacks.

But let's take another look at those charts. We see that nearly a third (32.8%) of Hispanics lack health insurance. So their health outcomes must be even worse, right? Well...no. The infant mortality rate for Hispanics is marginally lower than that for non-Hispanic whites, and their life expectancy is 2.4/3.6 years (male/female) greater than the life expectancy of non-Hispanic whites.

This is probably due in part to the fact that about 40% of Hispanics in the US are foreign-born, since immigrants tend to outlive native Americans of the same race, but this can only explain why Hispanics live longer than whites--it doesn't explain why they live so much longer than blacks, who have greater access to health care. Nor can it explain the longevity and low infant mortality of Asians, who are also significantly more likely than whites to lack health insurance, yet manage to live 6.1/6.4 years longer.

It's times like this when I think that the world might make a bit more sense if I believed in human biodiversity.

*For some reason Latinos are considered to be whites of Hispanic origin in most US government statistics.


Female Privilege

If you hang around feminists for more than fifteen minutes, the term "male privilege" will come up. Essentially, this is the term feminists use to collectively describe the ways in which life is easier for men and/or harder for women.

One interesting characteristic of male privilege is that it's largely invisible to men. It's like an iceberg. We men, from our privileged terrestrial positions, can only see the tip of the iceberg, but women, forced to live in the icy depths of the Arctic Ocean by their male oppressors, can see the whole thing. Also, while feminist men can't see it directly, they can infer its presence. Feminism is kind of like sonar that way.

Anyway, some time back Ampersand nailed the a list of 46 aspects of Male Privilege to the door of the Patriarchy headquarters. We were out touring the world's strip clubs and golf courses on official business at the time, so we're just now getting around to responding. Ballgame over at the Feminist Critics Blog is on it with a Female Privilege Checklist. You'll note that his list is only half as long as Ampersand's, but we're still going to give him twice the recognition. Great job, Ballgame. Have another link.

I have some more items to add to the list:

  1. If I marry, there is a very good chance that I will be given the option to quit my job and live off my husband’s* income without having my femininity questioned.
  2. If I become pregnant, I and I alone choose whether to terminate the pregnancy or have the baby. As a result, I can be reasonably certain that I will never be held financially responsible for a child I didn’t want to have, and that I will never have my unborn child aborted without my consent.
  3. Many employers, including the government, have policies specifically designed to privilege me over male candidates.
  4. If my husband is unfaithful to me or abuses me, I will receive sympathy unmixed with derision.
  5. I am significantly more likely to graduate from college than I would be if I were a man.
  6. Moderately impaired social skills are not a serious impediment to my ability to achieve romantic and sexual fulfillment.
  7. Although I am every bit as likely as a man to allow my sex drive to compromise my judgment, I will never be accused of thinking with my clitoris.
  8. I can expect to pay a significantly lower premium for car insurance than a man with a similar driving record would.
  9. If I commit a crime, I will likely be treated much more leniently in a court of law than would a man who had committed the same crime.
  10. Men are expected to buy me drinks, meals, flowers, and jewelry in exchange for a chance to spend time with me.
  11. Because I am not expected to be my family’s primary breadwinner, I have the luxury of prioritizing factors other than salary when choosing a career path.
  12. I have the privilege of being unaware of my female privilege.

While I can't speak for Ballgame, I do not intend, in contributing to this list, to advance the idea that men are being oppressed by the Matriarchy. I certainly don't feel oppressed**. What I'm trying to do is refute the notion that either sex is privileged over the other.

Of course, I don't deny that there are certain privileges given to men that are not given to women. What I reject is the concept of Male Privilege: The idea that men are unambigously privileged over women. In reality, women have their own privileges, and very often privilege and obligation go hand in hand. For example, Ampersand cites as an example of male privilege this: "If I have children and a career, no one will think I’m selfish for not staying at home." But the flip side of this is that a man faces much stronger social pressure to be his family's primary breadwinner. Certainly working mothers far outnumber stay-at-home fathers.

Which sex has the better package of privileges and obligations is largely a matter of personal preference. Yes, most feminists think men have it better, but that's because modern feminism, having little left to offer a woman who relishes her role as a full-time wife and mother, disproportionately attracts women who think they're getting a raw deal. This may also explain why lesbians tend to be overrepresented among feminists--denied male privileges and unable to take advantage of those female privileges tied to heterosexuality, they really do get a raw deal.

*Yes, several of these items are shamelessly heteronormative. Because that's how we patriarchs roll.

**I note this because a common feminist tactic is to cast any attempt to point out female privileges as whining by men afraid of feminism's challenge to their own privilege. Of course, talking about Male Privilege is speaking truth to power, not whining.


On Consumption vs. Income Taxation

Quoth Megan McArdle, when asked why she doesn't support a shift from income tax to consumption tax in the form of unlimited IRAs:

Because with a decent tax code, there's no reason for the government to artificially bias peoples' choices towards savings and away from consumption. The bourgeois moral affection for savings is a socially useful cultural belief, but it is not actually a moral law. Savings is just time-shifted consumption. I see no moral difference between consumption now and consumption later.

I disagree for a couple of reasons. First, it's not clear to me that a consumption tax would artificially encourage savings any more than an income tax encourages current consumption. And by inflating the currency while not allowing taxpayers to adjust the cost bases of our investments for inflation (i.e., if inflation is 3% and I sell a bond which has earned a 5% annual return, my real annual return is only 2%, but I'm taxed on the full 5%), the government is arguably actively dicouraging saving.

Furthermore, investment, while not necessarily morally superior to current consumption, has positive externalities that we should be encouraging. A higher capital-to-labor ratio increases labor productivity and drives up wages. And certainly it's good for society--both in a practical sense and in a moral sense--if more people have enough money socked away to smooth over a rough spot or two without suffering the indignity of relying on the government for help.


Correlation Is Evidence

Commenting on a post by Arnold Kling, Megan McArdle says that correlation is not evidence of causation:

Correlations are, at best, suggestive. They are not by themselves evidence--nay, not even if you cross your arms, scowl at your opponent, and say "Well, then give me another explanation for this astonishing correlation!" Until you've got something better than a simple correlation, the burden of proof remains upon you.

As I've said before, a strongly statistically significant correlation is, by definition, unlikely to be spurious, and therefore strongly suggestive of some kind of causal connection. It's not conclusive evidence--dredge through enough data and you're bound to turn up some spurious collations with very small p-values--but it's evidence nevertheless.

Of course, you don't get to pick the causal relationship you like best and claim that the correlation proves it--there are always alternative explanations. But neither can you say "correlation is not causation" and then sweep an inconvenient correlation under the rug. A highly significant correlation almost always means that there's something interesting going on, and a model that can't explain it is likely flawed, or at best incomplete.

The more interesting point raised in Dr. Kling's post is his observation that correlations may not always be as significant as they appear, because a steady trend is really only two data points.


Great Moments in Advertising

Not a loan shark

Because when you're in the market for a 30-year loan, nothing inspires confidence like a shark.

To be fair, the actual ad is an animated GIF whose next frame says "Stop feeding the rent shark." Still...wow.


The Optimal Solution Is Two for Me and None for You

This old post from Megan McArdle came up in a conversation with a friend:

In his books Bobos in Paradise, David Brooks talks about status-wealth disequilibrium; the wealthy coastal cities are crowded with people who have money made in un-fun jobs, and people who have fun jobs that don't pay so well. The ideal, Brooks points out, is for members of one group to marry the other, to even things out, but unfortunately it generally doesn't work out that way.

From ten thousand feet, this seems to make sense. But the flaw becomes apparent as soon as you start to think about it: The reason this doesn't happen is that the person with the fun job brings nothing to the table. The rich person can share his money, but the advantages of a fun job can't be shared, and go exclusively to the person doing the job. This evens out wealth inequalities without evening out fun inequalities, which actually increases inequalities in total utility.

All else being equal, just about everyone would prefer to have a spouse who makes a lot of money. Granted, there are many men--me, for one--who would prefer not to make less than their wives, but I suspect that virtually all men making $X per year would prefer a wife who makes $0.8X per year to one who makes $0.2X. And so we get assortative mating: Lawyers marry lawyers, and starving artists marry starving artists.

The primary exception to this rule is when the person with the fun job is an attractive woman. But what she brings to the table here is her looks, not her job--an attractive woman with a high-paying job is still preferable to an attractive woman with a fun job.

I guess another exception might be when the couple plans on a traditional family in which the wife stays home and takes care of the children--if she's not working, it doesn't matter what kind of work she's not doing.

It's possible that McArdle is misstating Brooks' thesis--she refers to a status-wealth disequilibrium, so maybe Brooks had envisioned a scenario in which a high-status, low-paying job somehow confers status on the worker's spouse. I can't think of a good example though.

In any case, the solution as summarized by McArdle is one only a journalist could love.


Beyond Repair

Bored Maytag Repairman

An anonymous commenter at Bobvis has this to say:

Ideally, a product so shoddy that it shouldn't be bought, would be removed by the market when people figured out not to buy it.

The problem: people are so jaded towards crappy-quality products (and throwing things away rather than repairing) that the market is indeed failed in this regard. It's no longer a choice of not buying the badly-made product, they're all so badly made you might as well pick the least expensive.

I encounter this sentiment a lot, and honestly, I don't know what these people are talking about--as far as I can tell, durable goods nowadays are more reliable than they've ever been. My grandfather was a refrigerator repairman, but I've never in my life known a refrigerator to break down. In fact, my experience with durable goods in general has been almost totally positive. The only durable goods I've ever had break down on me were a few computer parts (arguably my fault in most cases), a monitor, a water heater, and a toaster oven.

It's true that we don't repair broken durable goods as often as we used to, but there are several good reasons for this that have nothing to do with being jaded.

First, the Baumol effect. While productivity in capital-intensive fields like manufacturing tends to increase rapidly, productivity in labor-intensive fields like repair tends to increase slowly if at all. As a result, the cost of replacement relative to repair tends to fall over time.

Technological improvements can make repair more expensive in absolute terms as well. Many durable goods are much more sophisticated than they used to be, often replacing or supplementing mechanical parts with electronic circuitry and embedded computers. These may enhance funcitonality or reliability (moving parts are far more likely to break down), but reduce serviceability.

Furthermore, rapid technological improvement can shift the cost-benefit analysis in favor of replacement. If repairing something costs $200 and replacing it with an identical model costs $400, it probably makes sense to repair. But if $400 buys a newer and much better model, then it may make sense to buy the newer model rather than repairing the old one.

Ironically, increased reliability may actually contribute to a tendency to replace rather than repair. Designing products to be easily serviceable is not without its costs--to make a product serviceable, it may be necessary to make it larger or more expensive, or to compromise in other ways. When an expensive product has a 50% chance of failure in the first few years, it probably makes sense to design it for serviceability. But if there's only a 5% chance of failure, it may not.

There are probably some other factors that I haven't thought of, but those are the big ones.


Taxpayer Is Not a Binary Classification

I've noticed that some people tend to think of "taxpayer" as being a binary classification--i.e., one either pays taxes or one does not, and the amount is irrelevant. For example, here's Ampersand protesting that, contra Megan McArdle, he doesn't just want to tax the rich to pay for his favorite social programs--after all, he pays taxes, too.

Well, that's technically true. But Ampersand once mentioned that a one-percentage-point increase in the payroll tax rate would cost him $2.30 per week, suggesting wages of about $12,000 per year. Income taxes at that level would be negligible, and as an Oregon resident he pays no sales taxes. I gather that he's part-owner of a house, so he probably does pay some property taxes. If we count the full ~15% for payroll taxes, that suggests an annual tax bill of about $3000, barring significant royalty or other non-wage income.

In the US, government at all levels spends nearly $14,000 per person per year. Merely paying a few thousand in taxes does not mean that a person is making a net contribution to the public treasury and thus helping to pay for social programs and various forms of redistribution. These are paid for almost exclusively by people in the top income quintile, and among them the burden is skewed heavily towards the top, with some people paying tens, hundreds, thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of times more in taxes than Ampersand.

Nor are all taxpayers affected equally by changes in the tax structure. While I'm not sure about Ampersand specifically, almost all left-wing proposals for increasing tax revenues are narrowly targeted to the top 5-10% of income earners. While it's true that not everyone in this category is a conservative or libertarian, it's also true that the vast majority of welfare statists are not in this category, so Megan was perfectly correct to say that most people who favor increased government spending want to do it with other people's money.

This post by hilzoy at Obsidian Wings provides another example. Responding to Pat Buchanan's claim that white Americans have spent huge sums of money trying to lift black Americans out of poverty, hilzoy writes:

Who provided welfare, food stamps, etc.? Not white people, but the US government, and through it, the taxpayers. Blacks pay taxes. They helped to provide those programs. To imagine that they did not is, quite literally, to write them out of the citizenry.

Well, no, it isn't. It's an acknowledgement of an incontrovertible fact. Yes, most black Americans pay taxes at some point in their lives, but on average they pay much less per capita than whites do, because of their lower earnings and the progressivity of the tax system. I don't think the IRS collects tax data by race, but I would hazard a guess that blacks pay 5% of the taxes in the US, give or take a few percentage points. While there are a great many black Americans who have made net contributions to the government coffers, there's no question that AFDC, WIC, Medicaid and the like* have, in the aggregate, redistributed wealth from white Americans to black Americans**.

This fallacy is not limited to the left. I've seen conservatives and libertarians appeal to the unfairness of making the working poor pay taxes to subsidize things that benefit primarily the upper and middle classes, like higher education, national parks, and funding for the arts. While I certainly agree that it would be good to scale back these subsidies, it simply isn't true that the working poor are subsidizing these programs. They may be paying taxes, but "taxpayer" is not a binary classification.

*The direction of redistribution due to Social Security is not obvious. Blacks have lower life expectancy than whites, but people with lower lifetime incomes tend to have a more favorable benefit/tax ratio while living.

**This is not to say that these programs haven't actually contributed to the persistence of black poverty, but if that's the case, then welfare statists have no one to blame but themselves.


The Infant IQ Gap

Micha's post below quotes a description of Roland Fryer's purported debunking of the black-white IQ gap:

Are blacks genetically predisposed to be less intelligent than whites? With a collaborator from the University of Chicago, Mr Fryer debunked this idea. Granted, blacks score worse than whites on intelligence tests. But Mr Fryer looked at data from new tests on very young children. At eight months to a year, he found almost no racial gap, and that gap disappeared entirely when he added controls for such things as low birth weight.

The paper, co-authored with Steven Levitt, is here (PDF).

While I think it would be great if environmental adjustments could correct the IQ gap, and I hope Dr. Fryer is successful in finding a solution, this is by no means a debunking of the genetic hypothesis.

For one, it's not at all clear that infant testing measures the same underlying factor as adult IQ tests. The test used is the Bayley Scale of Infant Development, which according to the paper has a correlation of 0.3 with IQ at age 5, meaning that it explains only 9% of the variation in IQ at the age of 5, and the correlation with adult IQ is presumably somewhat weaker. It's likely that BSID is more a measure of normal development than of genetic potential for intelligence. Note the reference to low birth weight babies having lower BSID scores, and also this study, which found that BSID weakly predicted IQ in children exposed to an environmental toxin but not at all in the matched controls.

Or it could be the case that black and white children simply develop along different trajectories. This is consistent with adoption studies, which have found that the IQ gap between black and white children adopted into white families starts small and grows over time. Granted, this is not the only possible explanation (e.g., it could be due to peer group effects).

Also worth noting: At eight months to a year, there is no sexual gap in facial hair growth.