Abortion And Federalism

From Radley Balko's latest Foxnews article:

Abortion policy, then, is a game of line-drawing. We're looking for the moment at which a fetus reaches the stage of viability, when its right to live becomes more compelling than its mother's right to terminate her pregnancy. Enmeshed in this line-drawing game are deep convictions about morality, and personal and community values, not to mention medical technology, which continually pushes back the point at which a fetus can survive outside the womb.

While it's unlikely that the Founding Fathers anticipated the abortion debate, they did give us a framework around which to govern on issues just like it — highly emotional, high-stakes issues that go to the core of one's personal values and beliefs. They rightly recognized that the federal government is far too unwieldy and clumsy to deal with such delicate matters. These issues are best legislated by the states — or, better, by cities or counties. We can then choose to live under laws that most reflect our values. We vote with our feet.

Line-drawing is a police power. And the Constitution's framers correctly concluded that police powers ought to be reserved for the states, not the federal government (note: several more recent Supreme Court justices seem, sadly, to disagree). The best solution to the abortion debate, then, isn't Roe, which even many abortion-rights advocates will concede is bad law. But it isn't a pro-life amendment or a federal ban on abortion, either.

The best solution is robust federalism. Forgo Roe, and let each state set its own policies on abortion. Those for whom abortion is an important fundamental right can live in areas where abortions are widely available. Those adamantly opposed to any and all abortions can live in jurisdictions that ban the procedure. People like me could live in communities where our tax dollars won't be funding abortions.

We don't have to find the exact right answer to all moral issues. Sometimes there isn't one.

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Kip, As for Congress

Kip,

As for Congress immediately moving for a "Right to Life Act," that's why I noted in the column that the only way this solution would work would be for the Supreme Court to state in any opinion reversing Roe that not only can the federal government not guarnatee the right to an abortion, it can't prohibit abortion, either.

Your point about people not having the means to move to another town or state is well taken. But had you actually read the column, you'd see I addressed that, too. That well may be. But is it any easier to move out of the country? Shouldn't we at least try to make it easier for people to move to jurisdictions where the laws are more in line with their values instead of uniform federal laws that make us all live by the moral code of whichever party is in office?

Finally, yes, there may be people who are very liberal but pro-life, or very conservative but pro-choice, and find themselves stuck in communities that don't reflect their own position on abortion. But like anything else, those are decision they should at least be free to make. Decide which value is more important to you -- more economic freedom, or the right to have an abortion. At least with a federalist system, you have that choice. When Congress makes all the rules, your only option is to live by all the rules Congress makes.

Federalism doesn't solve the abortion debate. It's a compromise that would effect more freedom for more people than what we have now.

Does anybody seriously doubt

Does anybody seriously doubt that, if Roe v. Wade were overturned on Wednesday afternoon, then by 8AM Thursday morning there would be a Federal Right to Life Act introduced in both houses of Congress nullifying any federalism approach? No one passionate about this issue seriously advocates a state-by-state approach.

Balko is his own worst counterexample. People who believe, either way, that this is an issue regarding "deep convictions about morality" are not going to be placated knowing that their state has the "correct" abortion policy while the next state over does not.

And the idea that people "vote with their feet" over an issue like abortion is hopelessly naive. People might move 50 miles to find a better school district, or across the river to enjoy a lower tax rate, but they're not going to pack and relocate seeking out the "pro-XX" position they favor.

So instead of being able to

So instead of being able to take abortion freedom as a given, you'd ask them to give up living in large parts of the USA in order to have it should they need it.

All this so people like Balko, who already "live in communities where our tax dollars won’t be funding abortions" (due to Medicaid bans in most states), can feel a little better about themselves.

People like that make me all the more certain that Roe was rightly decided, and all the infringements like Casey are wrong.  Busybodies (in government or out) have no business interfering.

Radley, Would you have

Radley,

Would you have championed this approach in the dispute over slavery?

Your plan would be reasonable so long as the rights of all parties to choose their jurisdiction was recognized. But those parties include the unborn, whose rights your plan does not recognize.

I'm voting with my mind on

I'm voting with my mind on the abortion issue, unlike most proponents of abortion and not a few opponents of it. On the pro-abortion side there are (mostly) big-government "liberals" and "centrists" who hypocritically think that in the case of abortion (as well as a few other matters of personal interest to them) government should keep its hands off something. They are joined by many if not most libertarians, whose support for abortion seems to hinge on the notion that (a) a fetus doesn't become a person with rights until it reaches a certain stage of development (as if there were not continuous development from conception to birth) or (b) a fetus (until some arbitrary stage of development) is its mother's property to do with as she pleases (which, by extension, would vindicate Andrea Yates, who simply chose to murder her five sons at an arbitrary post-natal stage of development).

What few libertarians (unlike conservatives) seem to give any thought to is the possibility that abortion is of a piece with selective breeding and involuntary euthanasia, wherein the state fosters eugenic practices that aren't far removed from those of the Third Reich. And when those practices become the norm, what and who will be next? Libertarians, of all people, should be alert to such possibilities. Instead of reflexively embracing "choice" they should be asking whether "choice" will end with fetuses. I have much more to say about abortion and its implications for liberty in this post and in the links you will find at the end of that post.

(a) a fetus doesn’t become

(a) a fetus doesn’t become a person with rights until it reaches a certain stage of development (as if there were not continuous development from conception to birth) or (b) a fetus (until some arbitrary stage of development) is its mother’s property to do with as she pleases (which, by extension, would vindicate Andrea Yates, who simply chose to murder her five sons at an arbitrary post-natal stage of development).

Nobody denies that it is a continuous process, yet it is a process with radically different start and endpoints, and the way you phrase it seems to trivialize it; might there not be something important about the middle of it? For example, your statement (a) seems to be implying that zygotes deserve human rights. Why? Merely because they will eventually develop into a human? A cloning machine operating on a piece of my skin might "eventually develop" a human being inside of it as well, but I don't take note when my skin cells die. If you're seriously going to argue the pro-life position you have to show why a zygote deserves moral consideration whereas a sperm cell does not, even though the only chemical difference between them is the number of chromosomes and a few other factors.

Radley, So you're advocating

Radley,

So you're advocating that the Supreme Court -- without any precedential or theoretical basis -- undertake a new jurisprudence of eviscerating the Fourteenth Amendment for the sake of reinvigorating the Tenth Amendment, thereby further elevating the fiction of "states rights" over individual rights?

Sorry, but that's not a particularly libertarian proposal.

What few libertarians

What few libertarians (unlike conservatives) seem to give any thought to is the possibility that abortion is of a piece with selective breeding and involuntary euthanasia, wherein the state fosters eugenic practices that aren’t far removed from those of the Third Reich.

Okay, Tom, since you brought it up...

exactly how does individual decision power over abortion (backed by court decisions telling government to butt out) lead to state control in those areas you named?

(I think someone's been listening to Limbaugh, Dobson or Falwell with his BS detector turned off.)

The government can (and

The government can (and already has) affected individual decision power over individuals by creating incentives/punishments for those decisions.

Let's say that the ultimate goal for government is a Third Reich-esque elimination of all people with mental retardation. Although, through the right to an abortion people can choose to carry the child to term or not, the government can make it very difficult to care for the child. Let's say that the government decrees that education for the mentally handicapped will have to be paid out of the pocket of the parent. Or that there will be a sur-tax charged to the parent of a mentally handicapped child. While this won't affect the extremes, this would have a large affect on marginal expecting parents, that is, those who are on the fence about caring for a mentally retarded child.

It's not that difficult for government to get around those kinds of loopholes, if that's the desire of the government.

Kip: So you’re advocating

Kip:
So you’re advocating that the Supreme Court – without any precedential or theoretical basis – undertake a new jurisprudence of eviscerating the Fourteenth Amendment for the sake of reinvigorating the Tenth Amendment, thereby further elevating the fiction of “states rights” over individual rights?

Huh?

That's a mighty big reach,

That's a mighty big reach, Mike.  Not only do you posit a reversal of current attitudes, but government would have to provide lots of money for prenatal testing for those conditions it wants people to avoid.  How are you going to stop people from giving birth to children with conditions they didn't know about?

This seems likely to happen regardless, as Medicaid is on the chopping block.  So much for Republicans being "pro-life".

Of course, you're ignoring government's biggest disincentive to have and raise productive children:  Social(ist in)Security.  It depends on people to bear and raise a productive next generation, but gives them disincentives to do so (lifetime earnings are lower).

Brandon, I believe Kip is

Brandon,

I believe Kip is saying that if you believe (as he does) that the constitution incorporates an explicit right to an abortion, then a "leave it to the states" solution would violate equal protection (from the 14th amendment) in that some states will ban/deny a protected right to their citizens, which the 14th amendment forbids.

However, if you don't believe there is an incorporated right to abortion in the constitution, the 14th amendment does not apply. I believe that Kip is begging the question in his question to Radley, in that you must presuppose abortion is in fact a constitutional right in order to say "so you're in favor of screwing the 14th in favor of the 10th". And not only that, you must presume (as Roe does) that this right is fairly absolute and that there is an extremely strong burden of proof requirement to anyone seeking to curtail it in the slightest.

In his column, prior to the exerpted language above Radley states his position (and his view of the situation) which shows he's starting from a very different position than Kip:

First, my biases: I'm a pro-life libertarian. I believe in wide leeway for and tolerance of personal freedom, but I also believe that a fetus has some rights that the state is obligated to protect.

Abortion, then, is a weighing of the right of a fetus to live versus the right of the woman carrying it to terminate her pregnancy.

Most Americans believe — correctly, I think — that pregnancy is a process by which a fertilized egg grows into a human being. Polls show Americans to be overwhelmingly opposed to late-term abortions, but polls also show that Americans overwhelmingly support the widespread availability of the morning-after pill, a souped-up birth control pill that prevents a fertilized egg from attaching to the uterine wall, staving off a pregnancy before it begins.

I think the public largely has it right, here.

Abortion policy, then, is a game of line-drawing. [...]

Radley starts from a position that there are conflicting rights considerations in abortion and that thus it is a line-drawing and balancing act. This is very far removed from the reasoning behind Roe, which takes no account of a rights conflict and no theoretical standing for the fetus.

From that starting point, it is silly to ask/wonder, even rhetorically, whether or not Radley is in favor of eviscerating the 14th in favor of the 10th. Balancing acts & line drawing *are* best suited for local decision making, and contra Kip it *is* a particularly libertarian proposal (to devolve decision making from the center and towards the individual as much as possible).

People who believe, either

People who believe, either way, that this is an issue regarding “deep convictions about morality” are not going to be placated knowing that their state has the “correct” abortion policy while the next state over does not.

Round and round we go. You're right, people won't be placated, but I'm not concerned with that. You can't possibly make everyone happy, especially with an issue as sensitive as abortion. One-size-fits-all solutions never fit all. Either you have a national policy which makes half of the people unhappy, or you leave it to the states to decide. I think the latter is a better system, although not perfect by a long-shot.

Ultimately, the decision of when exactly the unborn are due a right-to-life is metaphysical. The government should not involve itself in such matters at all, on any level. I realize this leads to de facto legalized abortion, but so be it. Sorry, folks, the government cannot solve this one for you. You'll just have to peacefully convince people youself. If the government insists on being involved, I prefer it to be at the most localized area possible.

The question of when anyone

The question of when anyone has a right to life is a philosophical question Stretch.

Again I go back to the example of slavery. I don't think the question of how many people would be made unhappy by the emancipation of slaves is a relevant concern.

You don't address a dispute by assuming away the substance of it, yet the proposed solutions here assume away any rights of the unborn. That evasion won't work.

Why? Merely because they

Why? Merely because they will eventually develop into a human?

Biologically the zygote is a human. Personhood is a separate debate. However, I have noticed that many pro-choicers conflate personhood with humanness.

Biologists still debate the definition of life, but newly fertilized eggs are not one of the "hard cases" like viruses. Here is a reasonably servicable definition: a living thing is something with an internal blueprint (DNA) and the intrinsic capacity to act upon that blueprint. That is why sperm, unfertilized eggs, toenail clippings (and the cloning machine described above) are not living, but zygotes are.

The personhood debate is thus a debate about separating human into those who do an do not have rights.

Here is a reasonably

Here is a reasonably servicable definition: a living thing is something with an internal blueprint (DNA) and the intrinsic capacity to act upon that blueprint. That is why sperm, unfertilized eggs, toenail clippings (and the cloning machine described above) are not living, but zygotes are.

Since sperm and zygotes both contain DNA I assume you're implying the zygote has "the capacity" to act. But that's ridiculous; no zygote has ever acted, anymore than my toenail clippings have. If you redefine "capacity" so it include future capacity then that's fine, but to address personhood you have to reconcile it with the cloning machine example. Both zygotes and skin cells have internal cell processes and both require outside materials (like the cloning machine for the skin cell), so again I fail to see any moral distinction between a zygote and a sperm, an egg, or any other kind of human cell.

Since sperm and zygotes both

Since sperm and zygotes both contain DNA I assume you’re implying the zygote has “the capacity” to act

Two points:

1. Not quite right - sperm has only half a set of human DNA, meaning that it is not human.

2. The full phrase I used was "capacity to act upon that blueprint." I.e. build themselves. Zygotes create themselves -- bootstrap themselves -- based upon their DNA from the moment of conception. This means that they meet the biological definition of life.

That is where your cloning machine example breaks down. While the cloning machine could make a new person out of a piece of your skin, it would be through an external process governed by the cloning machine. With the zygote, the cloning machine is intrinsic to itself.

Now, if you could somehow reactivate some long-since switched off genes in those skin cells, then it could meet the definition of life: build itself withtout the benefit of an external cloning machine.

None of this means you have to reject the personhood debate, but it does mean that the personhood argument requires separating humans who get rights from humans who do not get rights.

Do you "assume away" the

Do you "assume away" the "rights" of the brain-dead when you turn off their ventilators?

The conclusion is not being assumed but decided on the basis of hard data:  the humanity of the brain-dead is gone.  Similarly, the humanity of the pre-conscious fetus (up until about 30 weeks) is not yet present, and it is wrong to subordinate the rights of a thinking, feeling person to it.

All these arguments about

All these arguments about when life that we should protect begins are fairly good arguments. Unfortunately they all have holes. There is no way that you can escape the problem of having to decide “It is wrong to kill this life form but it is alright to kill this other life form.” Justin almost pulls it off by positing that nonsexually conceived life such as clones are alright to kill because they could not arise naturally since they don’t have the ability to grow spontaneously. Once cloned and implanted in a womb, then what? Normal zygotes are also unable to grow to maturity without the aid of the mother’s womb. Hence you have the pro-choice argument against being forced by the government to be a baby incubator.
In the case of a clone –if it is posited to have reduced protection from termination, when would the protection kick in? Would infanticide be alright, particularly if it was deformed or would you just bump up the legal fetal termination date from six months to six months and one week, for example? In other words it is still all arbitrary.

I had the same thought Dave,

I had the same thought Dave, since the zygote (and all living adult humans as well) require some kind of an external environment in order to sustain themselves. I think Justin is saying that the degree to which an organism has "self-generated activity" should be used to determine whether it is living or not; it certainly distinguishes between sperm and zygote. However I still don't think his distinction matters much for the personhood debate, because instead of skin cells I can take bacteria as my example. (Bacteria are creatures with self-generated activity who don't deserve rights.) The distinction Justin points out is real though I think.

“It is wrong to kill this

“It is wrong to kill this life form but it is alright to kill this other life form.” Justin almost pulls it off by positing that nonsexually conceived life such as clones are alright to kill because they could not arise naturally since they don’t have the ability to grow spontaneously.

Not quite true. I have made no ethical claims, only biological claims.

It does however raise an interesting point in medical ethics, once the cloning process has "taken" (e.g. the nuclear transfer has been successfully completed) and the human clone now meets the definition of life, do they have rights?

More generally, it leads to the debate about where rights come from, or whether they even exist.

As a Christian I believe that all humans have an unalienable right to life. Most non-Christians reject the natural rights philosophy for utilitarianism, but I do not see why. Whether it is maximizing happiness or respecting rights, both system of ethics constrain behavior. This means they both have to appeal to an objective truth or collapse into might makes right. But I am not much of a philosopher so I could easily be missing something!

Justin wrote: 1. Not quite

Justin wrote:

1. Not quite right - sperm has only half a set of human DNA, meaning that it is not human.

If it's not human, what is it?  Horse?  Sea anemone?

You're committing two logical fallacies:  the fallacy of ambiguity (using "human" to mean both "of human derivation" and "human being" without distinguishing the two) and question-begging (why single-celled diploid human organisms are "life" and haploid are not, while the diploid and otherwise fully-developed brain-dead aren't either).

We allegedly have a government of limited, enumerated powers.  I don't see anything in the Constitution which gave government any power over what a woman's got in her belly.

If it’s not human, what is

If it’s not human, what is it? Horse? Sea anemone?

Does it have horse DNA? Sea anemone DNA? Of course not. Sperm are not humans because they do not have the full complement of human DNA. They have the potential to become human - after conception - but realizing that potential is an extrinsic process: eggs are external to sperm prior to conception. The biology of what I am talking about is undisputed: fertilized eggs are alive and human.

the fallacy of ambiguity (using “human” to mean both “of human derivation” and “human being” without distinguishing the two)

I have distinguished the two with the initial definition that I employed: full human DNA (not a half set) and the intrinsic capacity to build themselves based upon that DNA. That definition is all you need to know why sperm are not "human" despite being "of human derivation"

and question-begging (why single-celled diploid human organisms are “life” and haploid are not, while the diploid and otherwise fully-developed brain-dead aren’t either).

Wrong, the definition is consistent: you must have human DNA to be human: a half set of human DNA is not equal to a full set human DNA.

This discussion has not been about full-developed-brain-dead, but they are also humans. They may not be *persons*, but they are human. Even Peter Singer concedes as much (both of fertilized eggs and the brain dead).

I heard that Peter Singer

I heard that Peter Singer thinks it's ok to terminate late-term fetuses as well as 3-month-old newborns; however the same problem of continuity presents itself, namely how do you know it's a person one moment and not the next. As far as establishing humanity is concerned, I don't see any difference between a newborn baby and a 5-year-old, unless for some weird reason you think that only the ability to speak gives you personhood.

Peter Singer's views are

Peter Singer's views are controversial, but they are representative of utilitarian ethics and are internally consistent. The biggest problem that most people have - drawing a line - is also a non-issue as shown by the fallacy of the continuum. The classic case is a beard: it is difficult to draw a precise line between clean shaven and bearded, but that does not mean that there is not mean that clean shaven and bearded are not two distinctly different things. The same applies to personhood and non-personhood.

In Peter Singer's case, personhood is established through self-awareness and the ability to perceive yourself in time and actively anticipate the future. That is why a five year old is a person and a five month old is not. I believe that Peter Singer draws the line at one year, which is probably on the conservative side. I suppose it is better to err to the side of caution!

The problem of drawing a line for personhood is not a serious challenge to utilitarian ethics; nevertheless drawing a line for species is much simpler and cleaner. Once the sperm penetrates the egg and nuclear fusion (syngamy) occurs, a new organism of that species is created.

Justin writes: Sperm are not

Justin writes:

Sperm are not humans because they do not have the full complement of human DNA.

A culture of my skin fibroblasts has a full complement of human DNA.  So does each and every blood donation I've ever given.  Are they human beings?

Hint:  you're committing the fallacy of ambiguity (again).  Human origin or diploid human genetics does not a human being make.

the initial definition ... the intrinsic capacity to build themselves based upon that DNA.

Intrinsic?  You can culture fibroblasts with only a petri dish and some chemicals; they can be said to intrinsically build themselves.  Turning a zygote into a baby, OTOH, takes a woman.  (You remember women, don't you?  This abortion question is all about them choosing things that you don't like.)

Either she's intrinsic (therefore the zygote is a part of her, and she's entitled to get rid of it if she pleases) or she's extrinsic (and your definition is faulty).  Looks like you've got a quandary there.

That definition is all you need to know why sperm are not “human” despite being “of human derivation”

It doesn't tell me why they aren't "human" qua "human being".

Complete lack of anything that can be called a brain, let alone the brain functions of sensation and thought, is far more relevant to the question of "human being" vs. "not human being".  That's why we consider a fully-developed body with metabolism and circulation not to be a human being on the sole basis that it is brain-dead.  Now, you may not have studied enough biology to know this, but the newly-formed zygote doesn't have anything resembling a neuron.  It takes several months before neurons start to build, let alone interconnect, the cerebral cortex.  IIRC, it takes about 30 weeks (into the third trimester) before brain waves characteristic of wakeful awareness appear.

you must have human DNA to be human

Confusion of necessary vs. sufficient conditions.  It's a necessary condition that you must have water to live, but 10 minutes without oxygen will prove that water is not sufficient.

They may not be persons, but they are human.

I thought this was about beings with rights; in this case, something with more than a right to be maintained on a ventilator, but a right to occupy and make possibly-unwelcome (and sometimes dangerous) changes to a particular person's body.  These are two different things, and the latter should properly be held to a higher standard.

In the latter case, why is it wrong to insist upon explicit and uncoerced permission to be there?  Why should government force a woman to allow something like that against her will?

And Stefan writes:

how do you know it’s a person one moment and not the next.

Growth is a process, not an event.  When does an oak stop being a sapling and become a tree?  Just because there's a gray band of "can't decide" doesn't mean that there aren't clear areas on either side.

(I see Justin has also addressed this, but since I wrote it I'm going to post it.)

Engineer-Poet, I think

Engineer-Poet, I think you're misunderstanding justin's definition; he wants to draw a distinction between "beings of our species" and "beings of our species deserving rights". That motivates his definition of "human life" as anything that 1) has human DNA, and 2) reproduces itself based on that DNA (I guess that's what Justin meant in this passage):

Biologists still debate the definition of life, but newly fertilized eggs are not one of the “hard cases” like viruses. Here is a reasonably servicable definition: a living thing is something with an internal blueprint (DNA) and the intrinsic capacity to act upon that blueprint. That is why sperm, unfertilized eggs, toenail clippings (and the cloning machine described above) are not living, but zygotes are.

You may find this usage of the word "human" to be unorthodox, but it's important to realize that justin has stipulated the definition and that's why he says the things he does. So basically all we've done is define what "homo sapien" means as a biology term. Then we can ask: Do all instances of human life deserve rights? Well, clearly not; the newly fertilized zygote is in fact such an example. The next question to ask is non-biological then, namely what sorts of "humans" are persons? Which deserve rights? Well clearly zygotes don't deserve rights, and clearly 5-year-olds who can speak deserve rights. That just leaves everything in between. Which leads me to...

Growth is a process, not an event. When does an oak stop being a sapling and become a tree? Just because there’s a gray band of “can’t decide” doesn’t mean that there aren’t clear areas on either side.

True, but irrelevant. We're asking whether those grey bands really are grey bands or not. If they are, then the question "Does it violate the rights of the fetus to abort it?" has no answer. If not, then there must be a dividing line; this is simple mathematics. If we postulate that at time t1 it's unjust to do X, but at later time t2 it is, and if at every point between it's either just or unjust, then there must be some point between where it changed from one to the other.

I think you’re

I think you’re misunderstanding justin’s definition; he wants to draw a distinction between “beings of our species” and “beings of our species deserving rights".

I think he wants to draw his definition so as to pre-ordain his conclusion.  (I've seen this sort of thing before.)

If we postulate that at time t1 it’s unjust to do X, but at later time t2 it is, and if at every point between it’s either just or unjust, then there must be some point between where it changed from one to the other.

You're assuming that justice is binary, and that the value is both defined and knowable.  I think both postulates are faulty; it may be unjust to do something for reason X but just to do it for reason Y, and it's probably impossible to know exactly whether a human is sentient in the gray areas (e.g. minimally conscious or vegetative?).
.

I think he wants to draw his

I think he wants to draw his definition so as to pre-ordain his conclusion. (I’ve seen this sort of thing before.)

That may or may not be his motivation, but defeating his argument has nothing to do with his motivation for making it. As I pointed out, this redefinition doesn't really accomplish anything.

If we postulate that at time t1 it’s unjust to do X, but at later time t2 it is, and if at every point between it’s either just or unjust, then there must be some point between where it changed from one to the other.

You’re assuming that justice is binary, and that the value is both defined and knowable. I think both postulates are faulty; it may be unjust to do something for reason X but just to do it for reason Y, and it’s probably impossible to know exactly whether a human is sentient in the gray areas (e.g. minimally conscious or vegetative?).
.

Nonsense. If justice means anything at all it means that our actions are either just or are not. As for knowing if a human is sentient, it depends on what you mean by that. We can take exact measurements of brain-wave activity of the fetus. We know exactly when it develops hearts, lung, kidneys, etc. We can even make intelligent guesses about when awareness of the future (Singer's criterion) starts to appear. The question is thus not a medical one, but a philosophical one; what defines personhood? If we agree upon what does, then with the current technology we can make the determination of when personhood begins fairly accurately, and that's all the debate is really about.

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Could One State Outlaw Abortions in Another State?
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CLONING IS WRONG!!!! With a

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